Are photo vault apps safe?

Some are, some are not, and the App Store listing will not tell you which. A safe one encrypts the files, names its cipher, keeps nothing off the phone unless you ask, collects nothing and states its limits. A code screen laid over ordinary files is not safe. None of them protects a phone that is already compromised.

Three things people call a vault

The word "vault" covers apps that do very different jobs. Sorting an app into one of three kinds is the quickest way to judge it.

  • A screen lock. The app asks for a code before it shows your photos. The photos themselves are stored as ordinary files inside the app. Anyone who can read the app's files, for example from a copy of the phone's contents, can read the photos without the code. The lock stops a person holding your phone; it does not stop someone who gets at the data underneath.
  • A hidden folder. The app moves files somewhere less obvious, or changes their names. This is concealment, and concealment depends on nobody looking.
  • Encryption. The app scrambles each file with a key, and the key is made from your secret. Without the key the stored data is noise. This is the only kind where a copy of the files is useless on its own.

You cannot tell the kind from the icon or the star rating. You can tell from what the app says about its cipher, where the key comes from and what it covers. If it says none of this, assume the first or second kind.

Failures worth knowing about

  • Plain files behind a code screen. The commonest. The test: does the app name a cipher and say what is encrypted?
  • An account you did not need. If a local vault asks you to sign in, something is stored on a server. Ask what.
  • Copies in the cloud you did not ask for. Some apps copy your files off the phone by default. That can be a feature, but it is a second place the files can be reached from, and it should never be a surprise.
  • Reports that leave the phone. A usage or crash report contains whatever the app decided to put in it. You cannot read it, so the question is whether the app sends any.
  • Recovery that runs through the company. If the company can reset your vault, the company, or someone who breaks into it, can reach it.
  • Your files held back when you stop paying. Not a security failure, but a trust one. See what to ask before you buy.

What no vault can protect against

An unlocked vault can be seen by whoever is looking at your screen or recording it. Spyware or a phone that has been tampered with can defeat any app. Apple's App Privacy Report can show which domains an app contacted, but it does not show what was sent, so it supports a suspicion rather than a clean bill of health. A vault also cannot make you remember your credential, and it cannot copy itself somewhere safe if you never told it to. Our own list of limits is here. What StrongRoom does not protect against

Your five-minute test

  1. Read the store page. Find the privacy section. Apple's support page says it is information the developer reports, so treat it as a claim.
  2. Look for the cipher. The app's description or site should name one, and say what it covers.
  3. Try Airplane Mode. Open Control Center and tap Airplane Mode. Import, open and lock a test photo. A local vault should not need the network.
  4. Turn on App Privacy Report. In Settings > Privacy & Security, scroll to App Privacy Report and turn it on. After a few days of normal use, check the app's network activity: Apple says it lists domains an app contacted over the past 7 days.
  5. Find the way out. Look for how to get your files back out, and how to recover if you forget the credential.

If an app fails two of these, do not put anything in it you cannot afford to lose.

What StrongRoom has and has not proven

StrongRoom encrypts items, thumbnails and the index with AES-256-GCM, gives each item its own key, and builds the key from your pattern or passphrase plus a secret held in the phone's Secure Enclave. It collects no data, and its App Store privacy label will say Data Not Collected. It needs no account and it keeps its data out of device backups. Those are our statements; you can run the five tests above on it.

What we have not got: no outside expert has checked the app, and the source code is not published. The Recovery PIN is waiting for an independent review of its cryptography. It is iPhone only, it makes no copy for you, and if you lose the phone without an Export Package the data is gone.

For the full checklist, go up to the pillar. -> /guides/choosing-a-vault-app/how-to-choose-a-photo-vault-app/ For the plain steps a vault performs, see how vault apps work. -> /guides/choosing-a-vault-app/how-photo-vault-apps-work/ For one short answer, see whether a vault app is really encrypted. Is a vault app really encrypted?

Frequently asked questions

Are photo vault apps safe from hackers?

Only the ones that encrypt, and even then only against attacks on the stored files. No app is immune to attack, and none protects a phone that is already compromised.

Is a code screen enough?

Not if the files underneath are not encrypted. The screen stops someone holding your phone, not someone reading the app's data.

Is it safe to put my only copy in a vault?

No. If you lose the phone or the credential the files may be gone. Keep a copy you control, which for StrongRoom is an Export Package.

Has StrongRoom been checked by an outside expert?

Not yet. We say so on the limits page, and we will update it when that changes.

Sources

StrongRoom is a free iPhone app, coming to the App Store.

Free for iPhone. Pro is optional. What Pro changes.

Coming to the App Store. See what version 1.0 includes.